Preferences and skills of Indian public sector teachers by Fagernäs, Sonja & Pelkonen, Panu
This Provisional PDF corresponds to the article as it appeared upon acceptance. Fully formatted
PDF and full text (HTML) versions will be made available soon.
Preferences and skills of Indian public sector teachers
IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:3 doi:10.1186/2193-9020-1-3
Sonja Fagernäs (s.a.e.fagernas@sussex.ac.uk)
ISSN 2193-9020
Article type Original article
Submission date 22 May 2012
Acceptance date 10 September 2012
Publication date 29 November 2012
Article URL http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/3
This peer-reviewed article can be downloaded, printed and distributed freely for any purposes (see
copyright notice below).
For information about publishing your research in IZA Journal of Labor & Development go to
http://www.izajold.com/authors/instructions/
For information about other SpringerOpen publications go to
http://www.springeropen.com
IZA Journal of Labor &
Development
© 2012 Fagernäs and Pelkonen
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0),
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Preferences and skills of Indian public sector 
teachers 
Sonja Fagernäs
1
 
Email: s.a.e.fagernas@sussex.ac.uk 
Panu Pelkonen
1*,2
 
*
 Corresponding author 
Email: p.o.pelkonen@sussex.ac.uk. 
1
 Department of Economics, School of Business, Management and Economics, 
University of Sussex, Jubilee Building, Brighton BN1 9SL, UK 
2
 CEE, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United 
Kingdom 
Abstract 
With a sample of 700 future public sector primary teachers in India, a Discrete Choice 
Experiment is used to measure job preferences, particularly regarding location. General skills 
are also tested. Urban origin teachers and women are more averse to remote locations than 
rural origin teachers and men respectively. Women would require a 26–73 percent increase in 
salary for moving to a remote location. The results suggest that existing caste and gender 
quotas can be detrimental for hiring skilled teachers willing to work in remote locations. The 
most preferred location is home, which supports decentralised hiring, although this could 
compromise skills. 
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1. Introduction 
Improvements in education and health are of primary importance in enabling people to 
overcome poverty. However, there are great difficulties in providing good quality public 
services in remote areas in developing countries. One key problem relates to attracting and 
retaining educated personnel in these difficult locations. Policy-makers have experimented 
with various approaches to motivate qualified key public service personnel to work in remote 
locations (see e.g. WHO, 2006). 
This study examines the problem that is common to many developing countries, by analysing 
the recruitment of public sector teachers in India. The sample consists of approximately 700 
teacher trainees studying at government training institutions in the state of Uttarakhand in 
2010. In India, the recruitment decisions of teachers have traditionally been made at the state 
level and teachers have been recruited as civil servants on permanent contracts. However, the 
practice has been criticised for producing unmotivated teachers with little incentives, often 
absent as they choose to commute to their rural workplace from far (Sharma, 1999). In an 
important study, Kremer et al. 2005 find that in their sample of Indian primary schools, 25 
percent of the teachers were absent during unannounced visits. School-level data for 2008 
suggests that 94 percent of public sector primary schools in India are in rural locations.
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However, rural areas can lack amenities that urban-educated teachers are accustomed to. 
Multi-grade teaching, with one classroom and one teacher shared by all pupils, is also 
common. 
The existing econometric studies on teacher absences and motivation in developing countries 
have focused mainly on incentive mechanisms to motivate teachers and monitoring 
mechanisms to reduce absences (see e.g. Duflo et al. 2010; Glewwe et al. 2010; Kingdon and 
Teal, 2007; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011; Banerjee et al. 2010). Another recent 
strand of literature studies the use of short-term contracts as an incentive mechanism. In 
particular, these studies have focused on the effects of the recruitment of local contract 
teachers (see e.g. Atherton and Kingdon, 2010; Bourdon et al. 2010; de Laat and Vegas, 
2005; Duflo et al. 2012 and Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010). 
This study approaches the question from a different perspective. Instead of the ex post 
incentives, or monitoring of teachers, it focuses on the job preferences and skills of teachers 
in order to draw inferences about the initial selection of teachers. We rely on a Discrete 
Choice Experiment (DCE) to measure the preferences of teachers at a training stage. This is a 
stated preference methodology that has been popular in the area of health and environmental 
economics for measuring preferences over various products or services. Its application to 
labour market questions is recent, and it has so far been used to study the job preferences of 
health workers (see e.g. Chomitz et al. 1998; Penn-Kekana et al. 2005; Hanson and Jack 
2010; Mangham and Hanson 2008 and Kolstad 2011). As far as the authors are aware, ours is 
the first study that measures the job preferences of teachers in developing countries using 
such an experimental approach. In the context of developed countries, there is a literature 
analysing the preferences of teachers from observed data on actual postings and transfers (see 
e.g. Hanushek et al. 2004; Boyd et al. 2010 and Boyd et al. 2011). 
In DCEs, the utility function of respondents is estimated from repeated choices of designed 
bundles of goods, or services that are presented to them. The DCE in this study focuses on 
the nature of the employment contract and pays particular attention to preferences over 
geographical location. The study focuses specifically on how the characteristics and selection 
criteria of the teacher trainees affect preferences. While some of the trainees have been 
competitively selected, gender balance and quotas for those with a low caste background also 
determine selection. Additionally, approximately half of the trainees were selected from a 
pool of current contract teachers (para-teachers).
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 Here, these trainees are examined to gain 
further insights on the preferences of teachers who are local to rural areas. The results also 
provide estimates of the monetary compensation needed to attract teachers to remote schools. 
The DCE reveals substantial differences in job preferences, in particular with respect to 
preferred location. These differences are related to a range of observable characteristics of the 
trainees. Most prominently, it is found that gender and rural origin have a significant 
association with willingness to work in rural areas. There are also significant differences 
between the preferences of the competitively selected trainees and the former para-teachers. 
On average, the former strictly prefer all other locations over remote areas, whereas this is 
not the case for the former para-teachers. Among the competitively selected students, women 
are significantly more reluctant to work in remote areas than men. However, gender 
differences with respect to location are less pronounced among para-teachers. Caste has no 
effect on job preferences. 
To our knowledge, our study is also the first to combine a DCE of public sector worker 
preferences with a documentation of the performance of the workers in a basic skills test, 
here consisting of knowledge of countries, English vocabulary, and Arithmetic. Our study 
finds substantial, and partly worrying heterogeneity in general skills. The joint analysis of 
preferences and skills raises concerns over the appropriateness of the current selection quotas. 
Women have lower general skills than men, lower caste trainees have lower skills than upper 
caste trainees and former para-teachers have lower skills than the competitively selected 
teachers. 
In drawing policy conclusions from the analysis, it is assumed that preferences and tested 
skills are not irrelevant for the effectiveness of an individual as a teacher. The results indicate 
that the application of existing quotas, which are set nationally in India, is likely to lead, not 
only to teachers with on average lower willingness to work in rural areas, but also to a lower 
levels of skills. Our results also offer cautious support for a more decentralised hiring system. 
The most preferred location is the home location, particularly among women. Rural origin 
trainees are less averse to rural locations than urban origin teachers. Among competitively 
selected teachers, rural trainees are not less skilled than urban origin trainees. However, if in 
remote areas, decentralised hiring would mainly attract candidates who resemble the former 
para-teachers, suitable location preferences would come at the cost of low skills. 
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the key background literature and 
Section 3 describes the background to primary education and teacher training in India and 
Uttarakhand. Section 4 discusses the data and reports the descriptive statistics. Section 5 
presents the details of the Discrete Choice Experiment used in the study. Sections 6 and 7 
report the results of the experiment and the skills test, and Section 8 discusses the policy 
implications more broadly. 
2. Background literature 
The study is related to several branches of literature on the recruitment of public sector 
workers in developing countries, of which the most relevant ones are discussed below. The 
focus is on studies on developing countries. 
The study relies on a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to measure job preferences. The 
methodology will be described in detail in Section 5. However, a few studies most relevant to 
ours are described in this section. The DCE is used to measure how teachers value different 
contract features. Traditional contingent valuation methods, that analyse individuals‟ 
willingness to pay for a certain product, or service, have been criticised, for instance by 
Diamond and Hausman 1994 as “deeply flawed”, with many potential sources of 
inconsistency. In DCEs, respondents are presented repeatedly with goods, services, or 
contracts that represent bundles of characteristics. The utility function of respondents is 
estimated from the choices made. Since the valuations are indirectly inferred from choices 
and the individuals choose options that represent a bundle of characteristics, there may be 
less scope for strategic responses than in traditional contingent valuation designs. DCEs can 
also be considered better suited to address multidimensional trade-offs and more informative 
as each respondent bases decisions on multiple characteristics. A brief survey of the method, 
and how it has improved the elicitation of preferences, is provided for instance by Hanley et 
al. 2001 
The application of DCEs to analyse human resource policy questions is recent, but 
expanding. Their use in this field has so far been limited to health workers. A recent surge of 
articles using DCEs for human resource questions in the area of Health Economics is 
reviewed by Guttman et al. 2009. DCEs have gained interest in this context given the absence 
of data sets on actual choices that public sector workers have made regarding their jobs in 
developing countries. They are particularly attractive when the variation in the range of key 
job characteristics studied is limited. In a recent review, Lagarde and Blaauw 2009 identify 
nine existing studies that assess how DCEs have contributed to the study of health worker 
preferences. 
In the context of developing countries, the DCE studies by Chomitz et al. 1998, Penn-Kekana 
et al. 2005; Hanson and Jack 2010; Mangham and Hanson 2008 and Kolstad 2011 on the 
preferences of health workers could be mentioned. The studies have focused on the role of 
pecuniary versus non-pecuniary (working conditions, resources, training) characteristics of 
the contract, and less on the nature of the contract itself. Location choice has been a common 
component in these studies, given the dilemma of attracting workers to rural, or unattractive 
locations. Generally, wage equivalents of preferences over different job attributes have been 
estimated. Serneels et al. 2007 and Serneels et al. 2010 use a contingent valuation framework 
with a payment cards approach to elicit the monetary rewards associated with attracting 
health workers to rural locations in Ethiopia and Rwanda. 
The studies generally show a preference for urban locations and that substantial salary 
increases would be required to attract workers to less urban locations. Some of the studies 
find that individuals who come from rural areas are generally more willing to return to work 
in such areas (e.g. Chomitz et al. 1998; Serneels et al. 2010). Serneels et al. 2007 and Kolstad 
2011 also observe that individuals, who in an experiment were more willing to help the poor, 
were also more willing to work in rural areas. The results by Hanson and Jack 2010 and 
Kolstad 2011 suggest that women had a higher preference for urban locations than men. 
In order to analyse how preferences and characteristics are associated with skills, the teacher 
trainees in our study were also asked to complete a simple skills test. There is still little 
systematic evidence on teachers‟ skills in India, or developing countries generally. In India, 
the SchoolTELLS survey revealed significant gaps, especially in the knowledge of 
Mathematics, among public sector primary school teachers in 2007–08 in Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh (see Banerji and Kingdon, 2010). Our test measured general, or subject knowledge, 
and not teaching skills as such. However, general knowledge and subject skills can be 
expected to matter for the quality of teaching. A recent survey (Bhattacharjea et al. 2011) of 
700 teachers in five Indian states found a correlation between a teachers‟ subject knowledge 
and pupil achievement. Evidence by Metzler and Woessman 2010 from Peruvian primary 
schools shows, that a one standard deviation increase in teacher test scores in subject 
knowledge raises student test scores by 10 percent of a standard deviation. 
The selection of teachers into the training included quotas for women and lower castes, and 
the association of these factors with preferences and skills is studied explicitly. While our 
study cannot demonstrate the effects of these factors on pupil performance, it is worthwhile 
mentioning some key literature in this context. Typical arguments for female and caste quotas 
are to avoid gender discrimination in selection, but also that women can encounter female 
role models (see e.g. Beaman et al. 2012), or that students encounter less prejudice if taught 
by teachers who share their gender, or caste. Some studies in a developed country context 
have found that pupils perform better when taught by a teacher who shares their gender, or 
race (see e.g. Dee, 2005, 2007). In the Indian context, an unpublished study by Rawal and 
Kingdon 2010 finds that students benefit from being taught by a teacher who shares their 
caste, or gender. However, a recent study for several countries questions the benefits of 
teacher-student gender matching (Cho, 2012). While some of the previous DCE studies on 
health worker preferences have found some gender differences in preferences, these results 
have not been discussed in the context of selection quotas, or skills. 
3. Primary education and teacher recruitment in India 
and Uttarakhand 
According to the 2009 Annual Status of Education Report,
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 on average 64 percent of school 
children in rural India within classes 3–5 have elementary reading skills, but there is great 
state level variation. The figure in the state of Uttar Pradesh is 48 percent, whilst that in 
Himachal Pradesh is 82 percent and in Madhya Pradesh 88 percent. The state of Uttarakhand 
has been a somewhat above average performer, with 74 percent of pupils in classes 3–5 with 
elementary reading skills in the 2009 ASER survey. According to the DISE 2008–2009 data, 
the average government primary school in the state of Uttarakhand has 2.3 teachers and 11 
grade 1 pupils. 
In Uttarakhand, training for public sector primary school teachers is provided exclusively by 
public sector training institutes, the District Institutes for Educational Research and Training 
(DIETs). The State Council for Educational Research and Training (SCERT) oversees the 
DIETs. A new two-year programme, the Basic Teaching Certificate (BTC) was initiated in 
April 2010. The BTC training is required to be able to work as a regular teacher in a public 
sector primary school. There are a total of 13 DIETs in Uttarakhand, of which 3 are so called 
“mini-DIETs”, given that they are located in districts with a smaller number of schools. (see 
Godiyal and Nautiyal 2008 for details). 
In the 2011 Census,
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 Uttarakhand is reported to have 10.1 million inhabitants, with a rural 
population of 69 percent. The state is relatively small geographically in comparison with 
many other Indian states, but a significant part of its territory consists of mountains. Travel 
times can be long even between short distances, and therefore remote locations pose a clear 
challenge for teacher recruitment. 
A Universalisation of Elementary Education (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, SSA) scheme, in 
operation around India since 2001, has aimed to improve the educational opportunities of 
rural children. In order to alleviate a shortage of staff in rural areas, local contract teachers 
have been used to staff schools in remote locations. These teachers do not have formal 
teaching qualifications and are employed on a contract basis with significantly lower salaries 
than those of regular teachers. However, the national Right to Education Act 2010
5
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restricted the use of untrained teachers, and the government of Uttarakhand decided to end 
the recruitment of para-teachers and offer BTC training for the existing para-teachers to 
enable them to become regular teachers. 
In 2010, there were 200 students in each DIET
6
 on the new training programme. Almost all 
students in the district specific DIETs came from the same district. They will also be 
recruited as teachers in the same district. There was a two stream selection process of the 
students into the BTC programme. Half of the students (to be referred to as „standard 
students‟) were selected on the basis of a composite entry score, which is a sum consisting of 
the entrance exam score and points based mainly on earlier educational qualifications. The 
entrance exam tested specific subject knowledge and teaching aptitude. All trainees were 
required to be educated to graduate level (a Bachelor level degree). In line with the principles 
of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) programme, there was a 50 percent female quota.
7
 
Further, to meet the nationally set reservations, there was a 37 percent quota for lower caste 
students. The other half of the students were former para-teachers, who were not selected on 
the basis of entry scores, but the number of years of teaching experience. The remaining para-
teachers in the state, who did not fit into the BTC training programme, were to be trained on a 
distance learning Open University programme. Same caste and female quotas applied to the 
former para-teachers. 
The starting salary of a regular teacher in Uttarakhand in 2010 was approximately Rs. 17–
18.000 per month ($340). A “cost of living” allowance, as well as a “hill area” allowance, are 
provided in some circumstances, and a “housing allowance” if appropriate government 
accommodation is unavailable.
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 The starting salary is considerably higher than in some other 
states, although there have been recent increases elsewhere as well following the 
recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission (see e.g. Kingdon, 2010). 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
The survey was carried out in DIETs in seven out of 13 districts of Uttarakhand. The state of 
Uttarakhand was chosen for its manageable size, but also the introduction of a new teacher-
training programme, including both former para-teachers and „standard‟ students. The survey 
was conducted in May 2010, right after the students (both standard students and former para-
teachers) had entered the BTC programme. 
Since the students had only recently entered the training programme, it can be assumed that 
the programme itself had not significantly shaped their skills or preferences. The study 
captures all teachers at an entry point to their careers as regular public sector teachers. One 
distinguishing factor between the two groups of students is that para-teachers have more 
teaching experience, although many of the standard students have some experience from 
private sector schools. 
The main criterion for the choice of districts was the diversity in geography. It was 
considered appropriate to include two geographically “flat” districts (Haridwar and Udham 
Singh Nagar) where conditions resemble those of other Northern Indian States. In addition, 
the district including the state capital was included (Dehradun). Out of the remaining four 
districts included, two can be considered remote mountain districts (Chamoli and 
Rudraprayag) and two less remote, mountainous districts (Almora and Nainital). More details 
of the data collection process are presented in Appendix 1. 
The questionnaire administered to the participants consisted of three parts. The first one 
focused on the general background of the students and their perceptions of the recruitment 
and work of teachers. This was followed by the discrete choice experiment and finally a 
timed, voluntary general skills test. The questions in the survey and job characteristics 
incorporated in the DCE were decided after discussions with a range of Indian education 
officials and academics, including officials in the state of Uttarakhand. The design was also 
influenced by findings in existing literature referred to above. A vast majority of the students 
had at least some teaching experience, and thus the presented choices should not be alien to 
them. The questionnaire as well as verbal instructions were given in both English and Hindi 
(the main language in the state). This section reports summary statistics. The replies to the 
DCE are analysed in Section 6, and skills in Section 7. 
A total of 707 students participated in the survey of which 40 percent said they entered the 
BTC programme as para-teachers. Table 1 summarises the data for the core characteristics of 
the teacher trainees in the sample. The first column summarises data for all trainees on 
aggregate. The average age is 30 years and 70 percent had a Masters (MSc) degree. Everyone 
in the sample was educated to degree level (BSc), so this variable is excluded. Around 40 
percent belong to a lower caste, and 75 percent are of a rural origin. Table 1 also shows the 
averages for men and women, separately for para-teachers and the standard students. 
Table 1 Summary statistics 
 All Standard Standard Para Para 
   Male Female Male Female 
 Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Female 703 .506 207 0 218 1 139 0 138 1 
Para-teacher 704 .395 207 0 218 0 139 1 138 1 
Age 665 30.0 202 28.9 211 28.4 127 33.1 123 31.4 
SC/ST/OBC 701 .417 206 .422 218 .431 138 .493 137 .314 
MSc Degree 700 .699 207 .739 216 .852 138 .551 137 .547 
Rural 692 .750 206 .718 215 .498 137 .993 133 .955 
Married 701 .635 207 .362 217 .571 139 .885 136 .897 
Any children 703 .541 207 .266 218 .422 139 .820 137 .861 
Number of children 703 .999 207 .401 218 .628 139 1.784 137 1.686 
Any experience 691 .754 204 .554 208 .625 139 1 137 1 
Years of experience 599 4.88 170 2.50 165 2.08 133 8.36 128 8.02 
Taught at private school 683 .395 206 .495 208 .601 139 .137 127 .173 
Salary at private school 269 3837 100 4296 127 4067 18 1228 22 2711 
Notes: Based on 707 respondents. SC/ST/OBC refers to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or 
Other Backward Caste 
There are larger differences between the para-teachers and the standard students. Para-
teachers are somewhat older, a lower share has a Master‟s degree, almost all are of a rural 
origin, and a significantly higher share is married and has children. Para-teachers naturally 
have significantly higher years of teaching experience, whereas a much larger share of the 
standard students have taught in private schools. Many of these characteristics will be 
controlled for in the regression analysis to understand whether para-teacher status as such 
affects preferences. 
5. Discrete choice experiment and the estimation of 
preferences 
As discussed above, the existing studies using DCEs to study the preferences of public sector 
workers have focused on health workers. The focus has tended to be on monetary versus non-
monetary rewards, as well as rural versus non-rural location. In our study, the DCE focuses 
on the nature of the contract and pays particular attention to preferences over location by 
including four location categories. 
In the experiment, all students were presented with pairs of contracts from which they had to 
select the one they prefer. These represented hypothetical contracts with characteristics that 
were deemed to be generally important and relevant for a teacher‟s job. To elicit a sufficient 
amount of information regarding preferences over the characteristics (attributes) of the 
contracts, the selection was repeated multiple times with different levels of the contract 
attributes. In our case, the number of contract pairs was 12 (see Appendix 3 for a 
justification). The contract attributes and their levels are presented in Table 2 below. A 
sample page of the survey is presented in Appendix 3. This section of the questionnaire was 
not timed; the students were given the amount of time they required to complete the section. 
All students received the same contract pairs to choose from. 
Table 2 DCE: Contract attributes, and their levels 
Pay Location Contract Transfers Staff and 
pupils 
Rs. 13000 
per month 
Remote village Fixed term contract, 
renewable every 7 years. 
Depend on 
connections and 
influence 
2 teachers, 75 
pupils 
Rs. 17000 
per month 
Village / Small 
town 
Permanent, must transfer 
every 7 years. 
Depend on merit 2 teachers, 14 
pupils 
Rs. 21000 
per month 
Your home 
village / town 
Permanent, possibility to 
transfer after 7 years. 
  
 District capital 
area 
   
Notes: 1 USD ~ 50 Rupees. The 2010 starting salary in Uttarakhand was 17–18.000 Rs per 
month ($340) 
The students were explained that this was an independent study and that individual responses 
would remain confidential and would not be revealed to education officials, or members of 
staff at the school. The aim was to minimise the tendency to provide “correct” answers as 
opposed to true preferences. As mentioned earlier, the multidimensionality of the DCE 
framework also mitigates such strategic responses. 
There are limitations to how many attributes can be chosen to be able to estimate the DCE 
(see Appendix 3). The incorporation of pay was considered necessary, as it was likely to be 
of fundamental importance and necessary to calculate the monetary valuation of other 
attributes. The attributes and their levels were chosen to be relevant and approximately 
realistic for the state of Uttarakhand and India to a large extent. 
Given the focus on location, it was considered appropriate to include more than two location 
categories. For instance, from the perspective of recruitment policy, it would be useful to 
know to what extent students prefer to work in their home village or town. The interpretation 
of the location should be straightforward for the teacher trainees, but it is important to 
recognise that respondents may associate locations with features not explicitly controlled for 
in the DCE. For example, the „Remote village‟ option will reflect distance, but is also likely 
to be associated with factors such as lack of services, electricity, or possibly lack of school 
resources. 
An attribute on the contract type was also considered important, given the concerns with 
permanent contracts and increased tendency to recruit teachers on a contract basis in India. 
The existing studies on the job preferences of public sector workers referred to above have 
tended to ignore this dimension. The attribute levels for the contract types incorporate both 
geographic rotation
9
 and permanence of the contract. Three types of contracts are included: 
fixed term, which is renewable every 7 years, permanent with rotation/transfer of location 
every 7 years, and permanent with the possibility to transfer every 7 years. The duration of a 
period until a change was kept constant to be able to compare the contract types with each 
other. Given that the current trainees were expected to be posted to a rural location for 10 
years initially, 7 years is not an unrealistic value. Offering teachers permanent contracts with 
regular rotation of location is a possible option for guaranteeing that remote schools are 
staffed. 
Transfers are believed to be affected by corruption, with political connections, or ability to 
pay playing a role.
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 When considering whether to prefer a permanent contract with the 
option to change, or a permanent contract with obligatory transfers, we might also expect 
teachers to take into consideration on what basis the decisions on transfers are made. 
Formulating a DCE question on the topic was challenging, but we wanted to understand how 
teachers value merit-based transfers as opposed to ones based on „connections and influence‟. 
The final attribute, the teacher-pupil ratio, is included as a general indicator of the demand 
level of the job. Based on DISE 2008 data, 10 percent of two-teacher public sector schools in 
Uttarakhand have 75, or more students, and 10 percent have 14 or less students. 
A discrete choice regression model is used to analyse the relative importance of different 
contract attributes for preferences and especially, whether location options significantly affect 
choices. As explained below, the analysis allows one to assess on what terms teachers would 
be willing to trade one job characteristic for another. 
The model 
Following the much used random utility framework (McFadden, 1974), we assume that 
utility from a job contract can be characterised by a function 
1 1 1 1
K M K M
ci k ck m mi km ck mi ci
k m k m
U a X Z X Z u  
   
        
  
(1) 
where contract c = {A,B} and i = 1…N refers to individuals. X is a vector of K attribute 
levels, and Z is a vector of M personal characteristics. The parameter βk refers to the utility 
associated with a contract attribute k and the parameter δkm measures how this utility varies 
by a specific characteristic of the individual. The term uci is random and represents 
unobservable influences on individual choice. 
The framework assumes that the individual chooses the contract option, which generates 
more utility. Now, the utility gain from contract B over contract A for individual i, is: 
     
1 1 1
K K M
Bi Ai k Bk Ak km Bk Ak mi Bi Ai
k k m
U U X X X X Z u u 
  
         
 
(2) 
The random component uci may be hypothesised to consist of three additive components: an 
individual specific component vi, a contract specific component ec and a true iid random term. 
Of these, the individual specific term cancels out. The contract specific component can be 
assumed to be zero, unless the respondents have a consistent tendency to be more or less 
likely to respond to contract A instead of B, for instance due to their placement on the paper 
(this will be tested below as a robustness check). Suppose the individual chooses contract B if 
UBi - UAi > 0. This takes place with the probability 
       
     
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 0
K K M
Bi Ai k Bk Ak km Bk Ak mi Bi Ai
k k m
K K M
Ai Bi k Bk Ak km Bk Ak mi
k k m
P U U P X X X X Z u u
P u u X X X X Z
 
 
  
  
 
             
 
          
  (3) 
Assuming a distribution for (uAi - uBi), for instance a logistic distribution, the probability in 
(3) can be expressed in terms of a logistic cumulative distribution and modelled accordingly 
with Logit: 
     
1 1 1
0
K K M
Bi Ai k Bk Ak km Bk Ak mi
k k m
P U U F X X X X Z 
  
 
            
(4) 
where F(x) = exp(x)/(1+exp(x)). This paper estimates Equation 4 with a logit model in all 
cases, but the results would be virtually the same if one would use a probit specification 
instead. The levels of the contract attributes are treated as separate dummy variables in the 
regression analysis, except for pay which enters as a single variable. The estimated models 
are based on differenced contract attributes as specified in Equations (2)-(3). Since the 
explanatory variables represent the differences between the attribute levels of two contracts, 
it is unnecessary to include individual effects (such as random effects). Appendix 3 describes 
the design of the DCE in more detail. 
One downside of a discrete choice experiment is that the interview setting does not constitute 
a real, but a stated choice. Some studies have been carried out to assess the reliability of 
stated preference in predicting actual behaviour, and they tend to show good correspondence 
(e.g. Adamowicz et al. 1994). In the context of health worker preferences, Chomitz et al. 
1998 find a “strong qualitative consistency” between stated and revealed preference. 
6. Results 
Given the significantly different selection process of the standard students and the para-
teachers, separate models are estimated for the two. The focus is on the standard students, but 
the results for para-teachers are discussed in the context of preferences of teachers from 
remote areas. The main aim of the study is to understand how characteristics and selection 
criteria affect preferences, with a particular focus on rural versus urban origin, gender and 
caste. All contract attribute variables, except pay, are dummy variables, which makes the 
coefficients directly comparable with each other. A larger value for a specific attribute 
implies that this contract feature attracts the respondents towards choosing the contract. The 
effects of individual characteristics on the preference parameters are measured through 
interaction terms between the contract attributes and specific characteristics. 
The interpretation of DCEs generally focuses on the trade-offs between different contract 
attributes. This can be done by comparing directly the estimated coefficients, but we will also 
provide marginal effects for core effects of interest in the text. 
6.1. Preferences of ‘Standard students’ 
Table 3 presents the results for a set of models for the sample of standard students. The 
coefficients in the table refer to the estimated β:s and δ:s of Models [1]-[4]. They measure 
whether the attribute levels make respondents more likely to choose contract B. Reference 
groups (for dummy variables) are excluded from the models. For location, the reference 
group is “Remote village”. For the contracts, the reference group is “Fixed term contract, 
renewable every 7 years”. For transfers, the base category is “Transfers based on connections 
and influence”, and for pupils and staff, the excluded category is “2 teachers, 75 pupils” 
(“Large class size”). Thus, the estimated parameters refer to preferences compared to these 
categories; in other words a significant positive coefficient would measure the extent to 
which the option is likely to be preferred over the excluded category. Since the model 
includes pay as an independent variable, monetary equivalents for the preference parameters 
can be calculated in order to facilitate interpretation. 
Table 3 Logit estimates of the DCE model, standard students 
Contract attributes [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Pay (1000 Rs.) .132 [.011]** .133 [.010]** .121 [.013]** .139 [.026]** 
Location: Village/Small town .507 [.095]** .576 [.088]** .779 [.105]** .880 [.220]** 
Location: Home village / town .658 [.095]** 1.022 [.092]** 1.225 [.115]** 1.104 [.230]** 
Location: District Capital area .368 [.096]** .636 [.091]** 1.006 [.110]** .749 [.225]** 
Contract: Permanent with 
rotation 
.673 [.068]** .577 [.063]** .681 [.076]** .700 [.157]** 
Contract: Permanent .783 [.100]** .723 [.094]** .770 [.117]** .833 [.238]** 
Transfers: Based on merit .940 [.074]** 1.035 [.071]** 1.048 [.088]** .891 [.176]** 
Small class size -.128 [.060]* -.043 [.056] -.127 [.067] -.173 [.137] 
Female x Pay (1000 Rs.) -.007 [.016]     -.003 [.017] 
Female x Village/Small town .188 [.134]     .170 [.144] 
Female x Home village / town .704 [.141]**     .701 [.151]** 
Female x District Capital area .563 [.138]**     .469 [.149]** 
Female x Permanent with 
rotation 
-.184 [.096]     -.224 [.103]* 
Female x Permanent -.067 [.144]     -.065 [.155] 
Female x Based on merit .223 [.108]*     .267 [.116]* 
Female x Small class size .127 [.084]     .159 [.091] 
Caste x Pay (1000 Rs.)   -.011 [.016]   -.013 [.016] 
Caste x Village/Small town   .026 [.135]   .043 [.139] 
Caste x Home village / town   -.069 [.140]   -.073 [.144] 
Caste x District Capital area   .002 [.139]   .067 [.143] 
Caste x Permanent with rotation   -.019 [.097]   .039 [.099] 
Caste x Permanent   .039 [.145]   .050 [.149] 
Caste x Based on merit   .004 [.108]   .014 [.112] 
Caste x Small class size   -.059 [.085]   -.080 [.087] 
Rural x Pay (1000 Rs.)     .012 [.016] .011 [.017] 
Rural x Village/Small town     -.319 [.136]* -.290 [.143]* 
Rural x Home village / town     -.375 [.144]** -.221 [.151] 
Rural x District Capital area     -.611 [.141]** -.516 [.148]** 
Rural x Permanent with rotation     -.181 [.098] -.226 [.103]* 
Rural x Permanent     -.04 [.149] -.054 [.155] 
Rural x Based on merit     -.008 [.112] .061 [.116] 
Rural x Small class size     .099 [.086] .139 [.090] 
Additional Controls    Yes 
**,*: significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Sample: Standard students only. Caste 
= Dummy for ST/SC/OBC, Rural = dummy for rural home location. Additional controls are 
dummy for having children, dummy for any teaching experience, and dummy for a MSc 
degree, but coefficients are not reported. Omitted category for Location is „Remote village‟, 
for Contract „Fixed term 7-year contract‟, and for Transfers „Based on connections/influence‟ 
Observations: 405 Individuals ; 4793 Responses 
The first regression model in Table 3 focuses on the preferences of male versus female 
students without controlling for other characteristics. The set of parameters for the contract 
attributes presented at the top of the table in model [1] can be interpreted as the preference 
parameters for men. The interaction terms indicate how the preference parameters of women 
differ from those of men. The preference parameters for women can be calculated by 
summing the two sets of estimated coefficients. 
To begin with the estimates for men, all parameters are statistically significant and with the 
possible exception of class size, have the expected sign. Male trainees value pay and have a 
clear preference for all other locations than the remote location. The home location is the 
most preferred location, although men are statistically indifferent between home and the 
village/small town category (H0: .658 - .507 = 0, p = .23). The marginal effects of different 
locations for men are as follows: „Small town‟: .122, „Home‟: .158 and „Capital‟: .089. These 
indicate that men are for instance 15.8 percentage points more likely to choose a contract 
with their home location than one with a remote village. Men also prefer permanent contracts 
over a fixed contract. However, they are indifferent between whether the permanent contract 
involves compulsory rotation, or not (H0: .783 - .673 = 0, p = .36). The marginal effects for 
contracts are .162 for a permanent contract with rotation and .189 for one without rotation. 
Male trainees have a strong preference for merit based transfers, the marginal effect for merit-
based transfers being .226. The sign for small class size is negative, suggesting that the 
average male trainee actually slightly prefers a larger school with 75 pupils to the alternative 
with 14 pupils and two teachers. Overall, the results indicate that merit based transfers, a 
permanent contract, and home location are the most desired job characteristics for male 
trainees. 
Turning to the female interaction terms in the first column, we find that women are more 
reluctant than men to work in a remote village. The interaction coefficients for all other 
locations are positive, and for the home location and the district capital, they are significantly 
and quite substantially larger than for men. The most preferred location for women is the 
home village/town. Overall, it can be concluded that women are significantly averse to 
remote locations. Secondly, in comparison with men, women appear to prefer permanent 
contracts without rotation more than permanent contracts with rotation, although we can 
reject the null hypothesis that women are indifferent between both types of permanent 
contracts, only at the 10 percent level (H0: [.783 - .067] - [.763 - .184] = 0, p = .067). This 
result is sensible if women are assumed to have more responsibility over raising the family. 
Finally, women are relatively more appreciative of smaller class sizes than men, and overall, 
indifferent regarding class size (H0: -.128 + .127 = 0, p = .98). Women also appreciate merit 
based transfers more than men. The marginal effects
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 suggest that the differences in location 
preferences by gender can have a large practical significance. For the home location, the 
marginal effects for men and women are .158 and .329 respectively, suggesting that when 
given a choice, women are twice more likely to opt for home location. The same applies for 
the district capital, for which the marginal effects are .089 and .225 for men and women, 
respectively. 
The model in column [2] focuses on the significance of caste for preferences, without 
controlling for other characteristics. As can be seen from the interaction terms in column [2], 
there appear to be no differences in preferences to any meaningful extent. A joint F-test of the 
caste interaction parameters does not reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero (p = 
.93). 
The third column of Table 3 focuses on the relevance of self-reported urban/rural origin for 
preferences, without controlling for other characteristics. The interaction terms show that 
trainees from a rural area are less averse to working in remote locations. All non-remote 
locations are valued less by the rural than the urban trainees, and these differences are 
statistically significant. For example, the overall valuation of the district capital over a remote 
village for rural trainees is still positive, but clearly smaller (1.006 - .611 = .395). Like 
women, the rural origin teachers appear to dislike contracts with rotation somewhat more 
than urban trainees (H0: [.770 - .040] - [.681 - .181] = 0, p = .037). In this case the result is 
statistically significant, although the intuition behind it is less clear. Urban trainees on the 
other hand, are indifferent with respect to rotation (H0: .770 - .681 = 0, p = .53). There is a 
noteworthy difference between urban and rural trainees in terms of the marginal effects for 
the district capital dummy. For urban trainees, it is .241 and for rural, .096. 
It should be emphasized that the estimates in columns 1 to 3 in Table 3 provide us only with 
unconditional estimates of the preferences of different groups, since they do not control for 
other characteristics. As such, the results may partially reflect the omission of confounding 
variables. The final column presents results of a model, which includes interaction terms for 
all the variables in the earlier columns as well as interaction terms with a few other control 
variables, namely, dummy variables for having children, teaching experience
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Master‟s degree. In principle, other interaction terms could have been included, but their 
relevance was questionable, in particular since there is a risk of significant multicollinearity 
with an increasing number of interaction terms. For instance, controls for age and marital 
status were not highly relevant after teaching experience and the dummy for children were 
included. 
The results of the model with the full set of interactions are presented in the last column of 
Table 3. Only the coefficients of main interest are reported. Some of the interaction terms 
with other characteristics are significant, but many are not. Even with a full set of controls, 
gender remains a strong determinant of preferences. The conclusions from column 1 still 
hold, as the preference parameters for women remain nearly unchanged. Even with the 
control variables, caste is not associated with job preferences. On the other hand, rural origin 
still remains a statistically significant determinant of preferences, and it can still be concluded 
that teacher trainees of a rural origin are less averse to working in the most remote villages, 
than those of an urban origin. 
Overall, the key findings of the models with a full set of interactions are that being female 
and of a rural origin are significant determinants of location preferences. Teachers from rural 
areas have a significantly weaker preference for both the district capital, and the village/small 
town category than teachers of an urban origin, when compared with the remote village 
option. Irrespective of the origin of the teacher, the most preferred location is the home 
location. Since the location of „home‟ differs by respondent, urban origin trainees would 
prefer most their urban, home location, and rural origin trainees would prefer most their own, 
rural location. Women have a much stronger preference for their home location as well as for 
the district capital than men. In terms of preferences, the results so far would speak in favour 
of a more localised hiring strategy. 
The results regarding contract type show that all examined groups prefer permanent contracts 
over fixed term contracts. On average, the trainees also prefer a permanent contract without 
compulsory rotation to one with rotation, but this difference is not large, and men and urban 
origin trainees appear to be indifferent regarding rotation. 
To provide a more specific interpretation of the results in the last column of Table 3, Table 4 
displays implied monetary equivalents of different locations for different individual 
characteristics. Standard errors are not shown in the table, but each figure is tested against the 
null hypothesis of zero. These computations rely on some assumptions. Since the utility 
function is assumed to be linear, the estimates assume perfect substitutability between 
contract attributes. While this is a simplification, it allows for convenient comparisons of 
contract features. For example, for urban origin men, an additional 1000 rupees ($20) per 
month would increase latent utility on average by .139, and being located in the district 
capital instead of a remote village would increase it by .749 in relation to the remote area. 
These figures suggest that 1000×(.749/.139) = 5388 rupees ($108) per month would be the 
amount that would make an urban origin male equally content with a remote village than with 
a district capital, assuming that all other job features are similar. However, rural origin men 
would not have to be compensated for a move from the district capital to a remote village 
given as they are statistically indifferent between the two options. 
Table 4 Monetary equivalents of locations, by gender and rural origin 
 Rural Urban 
 Male Female Male Female 
Monthly pay equivalent needed to compensate a move to a 'Remote Village' 
from Village/Small town 3921* 5141** 6327** 7696** 
from Home village/town 5860** 10705** 7935** 13227** 
from District Capital 1549 4750** 5388** 8927** 
Notes: 1 USD ~ 50 Rupees. Calculated from the estimates in column 4 of Table 3. **,*: 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, based on a Wald test (2-tailed). The 
calculation assumes general caste status, no children, and no teaching experience 
The estimated compensating differentials for taking up a post in a remote village are very 
substantial given that a government teacher in Uttarakhand state had a starting salary of about 
17–18.000 Rs. per month ($340) in 2010. Women are especially averse to moving away from 
their home village, particularly to a remote village, and would have to be compensated more 
than men to make them indifferent between the remote village and other locations. The 
estimates on monetary compensation indicate that if there were to be an extra compensation 
of 4000 rupees ($80) per month, for taking up a post in a remote village, mainly men from 
rural areas would be likely to respond voluntarily to such an incentive. Irrespective of gender 
or rural origin, moving a teacher from their home location to a remote village would be the 
most expensive move to compensate. The required compensation for urban origin women 
would be on average as high as 13,000 rupees, whereas that for urban men would be on 
average around 8000 rupees. The size of the compensating differentials may appear large 
given that the teachers will in any case be employed within the same district, which is 
geographically not a vast area. However, in the state of Uttarakhand even short distances may 
take long to travel due to the geography of the state. Some robustness checks for the main 
estimations are presented in Appendix 4, and they show that the conclusions hold for both flat 
and mountainous districts in the state. 
6.2. Preferences of ‘Para-teachers’ vs ‘Standard students’ 
The results of the previous section indicate that location of origin is an important determinant 
of location preferences. The sample in the study includes former para-teachers who were 
included in the training programme in 2010. These teachers were originally hired locally to 
teach in schools in rural areas and therefore 97 percent of them are of a rural origin. The aim 
of this section is not to address the broader question on the use of contract teachers, but 
simply to provide some indication of the potential implications for preferences of hiring 
individuals local to rural areas.
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 Here it must be acknowledged that if hiring would be 
localised with permanent contracts, the pool of applicants, even in remote areas, might differ 
from the current para-teachers who entered the training programme. Due to the quotas, the 
standard students and para-teachers on average do not differ significantly from each other 
with respect to gender, or caste. Para-teachers naturally have more teaching experience as this 
was their selection criterion for the BTC programme. 
Table 5 reports the results of three model specifications. The first two rely on a sample of 
both para-teachers and standard students. The third one reports results for a sample that only 
includes the former para-teachers. The first column shows the results of a model, where para-
teacher status is interacted with the contract attributes. The model also includes interaction 
terms between the contract attributes and the core characteristics in which para-teachers differ 
with respect to the standard trainees; teaching experience, having children and a Master‟s 
degree. The results of this model specification suggest that para-teachers value their home 
location less than standard trainees, and as opposed to the standard trainees, para-teachers are 
indifferent between a remote location and the district capital. The para-teachers are also less 
concerned with merit-based transfers. 
Table 5 Comparison of the preferences of para-teachers and standard students Logit 
estimates of DCE model 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Contract attributes Full sample Full sample Para only 
Pay (1000 Rs.) .127 [.017]** .124 [.020]** .091 [.033]** 
Location: Village/Small town .569 [.148]** .798 [.173]** .266 [.294] 
Location: Home village / town .989 [.153]** 1.264 [.181]** .104 [.286] 
Location: District Capital area .464 [.151]** .892 [.178]** -.159 [.293] 
Contract: Permanent with rotation .518 [.106]** .594 [.124]** 1.136 [.207]** 
Contract: Permanent .748 [.157]** .789 [.186]** 1.112 [.304]** 
Transfers: Based on merit .921 [.117]** .961 [.139]** .623 [.222]** 
Small class size -.005 [.092] -.067 [.108] -.090 [.179] 
Para x Pay (1000 Rs.) -.014 [.016] -.017 [.017]   
Para x Village/Small town -.071 [.137] .064 [.147]   
Para x Home village / town -.310 [.138]* -.155 [.148]   
Para x District Capital area -.487 [.139]** -.236 [.149]   
Para x Permanent with rotation -.036 [.097] .002 [.105]   
Para x Permanent -.084 [.144] -.068 [.154]   
Para x Based on merit -.339 [.107]** -.325 [.115]**  
Para x Small class size -.067 [.085] -.104 [.091]   
Female x Pay (1000 Rs.)     -.058 [.020]** 
Female x Village/Small town     .316 [.172] 
Female x Home village / town     .385 [.169]* 
Female x District Capital area     .099 [.173] 
Female x Permanent with rotation     -.513 [.122]** 
Female x Permanent     -.360 [.177]* 
Female x Based on merit     .196 [.131] 
Female x Small class size     .280 [.106]** 
Rural x Pay (1000 Rs.)   .006 [.016]   
Rural x Village/Small town   -.343 [.133]**   
Rural x Home village / town   -.406 [.140]**   
Rural x District Capital area   -.643 [.137]**   
Rural x Permanent with rotation   -.111 [.095]   
Rural x Permanent   -.053 [.144]   
Rural x Based on merit   -.052 [.108]   
Rural x Small class size   .096 [.084]   
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Individuals ; Responses 671 ; 7843 671 ; 7843 266 ; 3050 
**,*: significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Rural = dummy for rural origin (home 
location). In columns [1] and [2], the additional controls are dummy variables for teaching 
experience, for having children and for a MSc degree. In column [3] the additional variables 
are dummy variables for teaching experience, for having children, for a MSc degree and 
SC/ST/OBC. Omitted category for Location is „Remote village‟, for Contract „Fixed term 7-
year contract‟, and for Transfers „Based on connections/influence‟ 
In the second column, an interaction term with the dummy variable for rural origin is added 
to the model specification in column [1]. The results show that the rural origin of former 
para-teachers is a key reason for why their location preferences differ from those of the other 
trainees. The interaction terms between the location attributes and para-teacher status are no 
longer statistically significant, while the interaction terms between the attributes and rural 
origin are. Similarly to the results on rural origin for the competitively selected trainees in 
Table 3, these results highlight one potential practical benefit of hiring teachers locally. 
The third column shows the estimated preference parameters for para-teachers by gender, 
including a set of interactions between control variables and contract attributes. A key 
purpose of this exercise is to assess whether the gender effects present for standard trainees 
are also present for para-teachers. The results show that gender plays some role, but not 
necessarily as strongly as for the sample of standard students. Male para-teachers are entirely 
indifferent between the different locations with respect to a remote village. Female para-
teachers prefer the village/small town category to a remote village (H0: .266 + .316 = 0, p = 
.045), and prefer their home location to a remote village at the 10 percent significance level 
(H0: .104 + .385 = 0, p = .085). They are indifferent between a remote village and the district 
capital. Female para-teachers value small class size more than men. They value pay relatively 
little, and the permanence of the position substantially less than men. 
These results confirm that the former para-teachers, almost all of whom are rural, and were 
hired locally, are not averse to being employed in rural, or even remote areas, as opposed to 
urban areas. As opposed to female standard students, female para-teachers do not have an 
equally pronounced preference for non-remote locations. 
7. Skills 
The surveyed students participated in a timed test of generic skills, which focused on the 
knowledge of countries, English, and Arithmetic. A detailed description of the tests can be 
found in Appendix 2. The test was not designed to test teaching skills as such, but to provide 
a measure of general knowledge that could be compared easily across teachers. However, the 
measure can be expected to be correlated with the subject knowledge expected of primary 
school teachers. To begin with the analysis of skills, Figure 1 below shows the distributions 
of the test scores across the full sample of both para-teachers and standard students. 
Figure 1 Distribution of scores in skill tests, kernel densities. Notes: Epanechnikov kernel 
densities, default STATA 12 bandwidths. The first Principal Component has correlations of 
0.77, 0.80 and 0.83 with Countries, English and Arithmetic, respectively 
There is some room for interpretation regarding what represents a “good” score in these tests 
for primary school teachers. In the Arithmetic test however, Figure 1 shows a hump at score 
20. This is generated by those respondents who were able to answer addition and subtraction 
questions (10 questions each), but were discouraged by multiplication or division (10 each). 
The full test can be found in Appendix 2, and it seems that a score of 20, or below, could be 
considered a somewhat worrying result for a trainee. 
The determinants of skills in our data are interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it is possible to 
assess to what extent the quotas for women and scheduled castes, and the preferential entry of 
former para-teachers, are reflected in our measure of skills. It is ex ante clear that the 
preferred groups will have obtained lower scores in the BTC entry exam, and should be 
expected to have lower skills, if there is a correlation between the entry score and our 
measure of skills. However, once this selection effect is controlled for, the relevance of other 
factors, can also be studied. Of primary interest to us are rural origin and education. 
To begin with, Figure 2 shows the distributions of the normalised first principal component 
of the skill tests by key subgroups. It is apparent that despite large overlap, some differences 
in the group means do exist. To explore the determinants of skills more precisely, an OLS 
model is estimated, using the normalised first principal component of the three skill tests as 
the dependent variable. The model is estimated firstly for a sample of all trainees, and then 
separately for the standard students and the para-teachers. The results are shown in Table 6. 
The estimated coefficients can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. 
Figure 2 Distribution of skills for key subgroups. 1st principal component of tests, 
kernel densities. Notes: Epanechnikov kernel densities, default STATA 12 bandwidths 
Table 6 Characteristics and skills, OLS 
Sample: All Standard students Para-teachers 
Rural -.252 [.088]** -.151 [.094] -.535 [.303] 
MSc Degree .192 [.078]* .071 [.109] .219 [.104]* 
Any children -.160 [.082] -.181 [.102] -.104 [.138] 
Any experience .218 [.085]* .220 [.087]*   
Age -.044 [.011]** -.035 [.015]* -.056 [.015]** 
Quota/favoured groups:       
Female -.627 [.069]** -.411 [.090]** -.936 [.103]** 
Para-teacher -.477 [.099]**     
SC/ST/OBC -.420 [.071]** -.551 [.086]** -.293 [.143]* 
District effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 627 392 236 
R
2
 .34 .23 .42 
Notes: Dependent variable: Normalised 1st principal component of skills. **,*: significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels respectively. SC/ST/OBC refers to a dummy for Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribe or Other Backward Caste 
The regression results can be considered to conform with expectations. The results in the first 
column for the full sample show that the score for each of the quota-favoured groups is on 
average approximately half a standard deviation below that of the non-quota group. It is 
worth noting that one can belong to multiple favoured categories (ie. female and para-
teacher). 
Regarding the other observable characteristics (which are not primary selection criteria into 
the programme), in column 1 students from rural areas have lower skills, while a Masters 
degree is associated with higher skills. Older trainees do somewhat worse in our skills tests, 
while trainees with teaching experience do better. The last result could be explained by the 
fact that we tested skills and knowledge that the trainees may have been teaching to their 
students recently. 
Columns 2 and 3 show the results separately for the standard students and para-teachers 
respectively. Among the standard students, women and lower caste trainees have statistically 
significantly lower skills. However, trainees of a rural origin do not differ in their skills with 
respect to trainees of an urban origin. 
Among para-teachers, the scores of women in the skills test are nearly a whole standard 
deviation lower than the those of men. Also trainees from scheduled castes have lower skills, 
by 0.29 standard deviations. The dummy for rural origin is not statistically significant despite 
its large size due to the fact that there is very little variation in this variable in the para-
teacher sample. Further, among para-teachers, those with a Masters degree are more skilled. 
8. Discussion and lessons for policy 
The key policy dilemma that the results of this study provide insights to concerns the 
recruitment and willingness of qualified teachers to work in remote areas. The study has 
focused on the preferences of teachers over locations as well as the heterogeneity and 
strength of these preferences. However, other contract attributes such as the type of contract, 
the determination of transfers and pupil-teacher ratio were also assessed, and controlled for. 
In drawing policy conclusions from the analysis of preferences, one has to assume, plausibly 
in our opinion, that the location preferences and effectiveness as a teacher are not 
independent of each other. In particular, the prevalent teacher absences in rural areas are 
likely to be connected with location preferences. 
To our knowledge, this is the first discrete choice study of the preferences of developing 
country teachers. Some of the results, such as the unwillingness of women and individuals of 
an urban origin to enter rural jobs, have been established in earlier literature for health 
workers. This study extends the analysis of preferences by being more specific regarding the 
location and by adding more features of the job contract. In contrast with previous studies on 
public sector worker preferences, this study also measures skills, which allows one to assess 
the trade-offs present in hiring teachers with particular characteristics. 
The main conclusion that emerges from the analysis is that the current selection quotas are 
unlikely to be optimal from the viewpoint of hiring motivated and qualified teachers to 
remote areas. The results also lend cautious support for a more decentralised hiring system, 
since this could lead to teachers being matched better with their preferred location. 
The first conclusion can be justified considering the results on the preferences and skills of 
women and low-caste students. The results show that women, who currently have a 50 
percent quota in teacher training in Uttarakhand, are found to have lower skills on average 
than men. The lower level of female skills that we observe is likely to stem from the fact that 
due to the female quota, female applicants have entered the training programme with lower 
entry scores.
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 The „remote village‟ location tends to be the least desirable location option, 
but particularly among the competitively selected students, women are substantially less 
willing to work in remote locations than men. Given that the starting salary of teachers in 
Uttarakhand was around 18,000 rupees, the estimates in Table 4 indicate that in the case of 
women in general, a salary increase of 26–73 percent would be required to compensate for a 
posting to a remote village, depending on the alternative location category and origin of the 
teacher. These estimates suggest that location is a highly important non-monetary component 
of the overall compensation for teachers in India. Women are also more averse than men 
towards permanent contracts with than without compulsory rotation, likely to be explained by 
responsibility for caring for the family. Compulsory transfers could be considered one 
mechanism to react to shortages of teachers in certain areas. 
Teacher trainees from scheduled castes, tribes, and other backward classes are not found to 
have statistically significantly different preferences than general caste teachers in our sample. 
However, due to affirmative action, they are found to have significantly lower skills, by about 
half a standard deviation. 
From the perspective of learning, gender and caste quotas may be defended with an 
assumption that pupils benefit from being taught by a teacher of their own kind. However, 
given the unwillingness of women to work in remote locations, it may be that despite the 
intention of the quota, girls in more remote schools end up being taught mainly by male 
teachers. As Table 7 shows, according to the DISE data for 2008, more remote primary 
schools in Uttarakhand have a lower proportion of female teachers, and many of the female 
teachers have been locally hired para-teachers. In turn, teachers in urban schools are 74% 
female. This stylised fact regarding gender imbalance of teachers along the urban–rural 
gradient also applies to India as a whole, and is even somewhat worse than in Uttarakhand. 
Table 7 Share of female and para-teachers in government primary schools in 
Uttarakhand by school remoteness, year 2008–09 
 No. of Teachers Female Para  No source Grade 1 
Remoteness schools per school share share Electricity of water enrollment 
        
Urban 387 3.166 .735 .031 .407 .059 10215 
Rural:        
Distance to HQ 0–10 km 2820 2.628 .604 .095 .245 .079 41760 
Distance to HQ 11–20 km 2968 2.296 .496 .147 .168 .114 31447 
Distance to HQ 21–40 km 3843 2.106 .467 .198 .111 .122 33709 
Distance to HQ 40+ km 1908 1.966 .393 .252 .070 .136 15027 
Notes: Source: DISE 2008–09. „Distance to HQ‟ is the distance to the block headquarters 
(Block is an administrative sub-unit of a district). A „source of water‟ is either a tap, hand 
pump or a well. „Para‟ share refers to the share of teachers, who are para-teachers 
In the general section of our questionnaire, 52 percent of respondents agreed with a statement 
that the best way to place teachers into schools would be for teachers to apply independently 
to schools with localised hiring rather than placement based on the success on the BTC 
programme, or random allocation into schools. Our results on preferences also offer some 
support more decentralised hiring. The trainees typically rated their home town, or village as 
the most desirable place to be employed in as a teacher. Teachers of a rural origin are found 
to be more willing to work in remote locations, even after conditioning on other observable 
characteristics. There appears to be no significant drawback to rural origin teachers. Among 
standard students, their level of measured skills is not statistically significantly lower than 
that of urban origin teachers. In the full sample, teachers of a rural origin have lower skills, 
but this is driven by the inclusion of the former para-teachers, who are mostly rural.
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Regarding the para-teachers, our findings indicate that former para-teachers generally have 
lower skills than students selected through the traditional route. Further, para-teacher women 
have considerably lower skills than para-teacher men. On average, para-teachers are not as 
averse to working in remote locations as other teachers. Women and men do not differ as 
significantly with respect to their location preferences. The results indicate that if 
decentralised hiring in more remote areas would mainly attract candidates who resemble the 
former para-teachers, there would be a better match between location preferences and actual 
location, but this would come at the cost of lower skills. 
The results show that being able to work in their home village is of great value to female 
teachers. Therefore, again local hiring could succeed in staffing more remote schools with 
motivated women, although women on average might still have lower skills. If the current 
staffing policies continue, and female teachers are to be assigned to remote posts, the 
remaining option may be to try to increase the attractiveness the remote posts to women by 
other means. 
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Overall, the results suggest that it would be possible to recruit teachers who are not only more 
skilled, but also more willing to work in remote locations, by relaxing the existing quotas, 
and possibly replacing them with quotas, or additional points for applicants from rural areas. 
They also offer some support for more decentralised hiring. Here it should however be noted 
that if hiring would be local, this might attract a pool of applicants that differs from that in 
our sample. 
It is recognised that the overall impact of quotas evidently goes beyond the aspects studied 
here. Furthermore, as the quotas are typically set at the national level, there may be little 
room for state-level policy in this regard. The results are likely to be generalisable to the rest 
of the Indian states to the extent that in the other states a) the groups preferred by quotas have 
on average lower skills (and are thus benefiting from the quota), b) the groups preferred by 
quotas are not more willing to work in remote areas, and c) there are difficulties in staffing 
remote schools. These are not strong assumptions, and are likely to be true in most Indian 
states. 
Endnotes 
1
 Based on the District Information System Data (DISE). 
2
 Like many developing countries, Indian states have recruited temporary local contract 
teachers, in particular in more remote locations. These teachers generally lack teacher 
training and are paid significantly less than the formal teachers. 
3
 This is possibly the most reliable source of nation-wide performance data on primary school 
students in India. More information is available at http://www.asercentre.org/ 
4.
Provisional figures, see http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/paper2/prov_results_paper2_uttrakhand.html 
5
 http://www.educationforallinindia.com/gazette_right_to_education_bill_2009.pdf 
6
 The numbers are smaller (100) in the three “mini” DIETs. 
7
 The SSA framework for implementation is available at 
http://ssa.nic.in/page_portletlinks?foldername=ssa-framework 
8
 Source: Communication with officials at Uttarakhand Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan office. The 
salary is indexed to consumer prices, and has thus increased since 2010. 
9
 Rotation and compulsory service in rural areas after graduation have been common 
practices used for instance in the health sector in developing countries (see e.g. WHO, 2006). 
10
 Béteille (2009) reports that half of the teachers she surveyed in three states agreed that 
transfers require connections and 30 percent believed that they would have to pay to obtain 
the post they wanted. Ramachandran et al. (2005) report that in 2005, the government in 
Rajasthan transferred 20,000 teachers. To quote the authors: „Discussions with trade union 
leaders revealed that transfers and posting were big business in Rajasthan. Intensive lobbying 
followed bulk transfers and it was rumoured that political middlemen demanded Rs. 5,000 to 
Rs. 25,000 to cancel the transfer or ensure a good posting‟. 
11
 The overall marginal effects for women in column [1] of Table 3 are: Pay (1000 rs) .030, 
Small town .168, Home .329, Capital .225, Permanent with rotation .118, Permanent without 
rotation .173, Merit-based transfers .281 and small class -.000. 
l2
 A dummy variable for teaching experience is included instead of the actual years of 
teaching experience, since this allows for a larger number of observations. Some of the 
trainees reported to have teaching experience, but did not specify the number of years. 
13
 There is an emerging literature on the effectiveness of contract teachers. In the Indian 
context, the limited evidence available suggests that despite lower pay, or lack of 
qualifications, para-teachers perform no worse than regular teachers in India and may even 
outperform them (see Atherton and Kingdon, 2010, Goyal and Pandey, 2009, Muralidharan 
and Sundararaman, 2010). Studies on contract teachers in other developing countries produce 
somewhat more mixed results (see e.g. Bourdon et al. 2010, de Laat and Vegas, 2005 and 
Duflo et al. 2012). 
14
 The Uttarakhand BTC application data is publicly available, and entrance test marks of 
applicants are somewhat lower for women than for men. 
15
 It might be suspected that even if both para-teachers and standard students come from rural 
areas, the para-teachers would be from more remote locations. 
16
 According to the national SSA framework for implementation „The provision of 50% 
female teachers has been effective in bringing large numbers of women into the education 
system. However, the problems faced by female teachers need to be given due recognition. 
Female teachers should be supported to overcome security 
17
 This scoring method was based on the convenience of not having to go through hundreds 
of responses in two languages. Based on responses given in English, this does not appear to 
be a concern – only a few respondents gave occasional responses that were not actual 
countries, such as “Rome” or “Taliban”. 
18
 It was assumed that each level improvement within an attribute increases the utility by the 
same amount compared to the lower level (with reference to Equation 4, fixed term contract 
gets β=1, permanent with rotation gets β=2, Permanent without rotation β=3 and so on). 
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Appendix A. Appendix 1 Data collection 
The research team visited the teacher training centres (DIETs) of 7 districts out of 13 in the 
state in May 2010 (see Figure 3). 120 survey questionnaires were printed for each school with 
the aim of randomly sampling 50% of both standard students and para-teachers from each 
district, or having roughly 50 para-teachers and 50 standard students from each district. Table 
8 shows the final sample sizes, and how the randomisation of students was carried out. 
Figure 3 Districts of Uttarakhand, including sampled districts. Notes: The sampled 
districts (1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11) are shaded. (1) Haridwar, (2) Dehradun, (3) Tehri Garhwal, (4) 
Tehri, (5) Uttarkashi, (6) Rudraprayag, (7) Chamoli, (8) Bageshwar, (9) Almora, (10) 
Nainital, (11) Udham Singh Nagar, (12) Champawat, (13) Pithoragarh. Map source: 
Wikimedia Commons. GNU Free Documentation Licence 
Table 8 Sample size and notes on data collection 
 Sample sizes   
District Standard 
students 
Para- 
teachers 
Randomisation Notes on conditions 
Almora 43 49 50% of bot h groups randomised 
from student register 
Chairs, but no tables. 
Chamoli 62 56 Questionnaires distributed in 
classrooms in random fashion 
Standard students had 
chairs, no tables. 
Para-teachers sat on 
the floor. 
Dehradun 51 41 50% of both groups randomised 
from student register 
Most students had 
chairs and tables, 
some just chairs. 
Haridwar 63 43 50% of both groups randomised 
by staff, criteria unknown. 
Chairs, but no tables. 
Nainital 50 47 50% of both groups randomised 
by staff, criteria unknown. 
Chairs and tables. 
Rudraprayag 86 0 All standard students present were 
included. Only 8 para-teachers 
enrolled in the school, and thus 
not covered. 
Chairs, but no tables. 
Udham Singh 
Nagar 
71 42 All standard students present 
included, half of para-teachers 
covered (one randomly selected 
classroom out of two). 
Chairs and tables. 
Total 426 278   
Appendix B. Appendix 2 Skills tests 
As part of the survey, the teacher students filled a voluntary three-part timed skills test. The 
parts are referred to here as Countries, English and Arithmetic. The tests were designed so 
that it would not consume much time and would be easy to implement in different conditions, 
and would leave as little room as possible for cheating. Questionnaires were bilingual 
(English + Hindi), and instructions were given in English and Hindi prior to each skill test. 
Each component of the test will be discussed below and the average scores for each test will 
be shown in Table 9 below. 
Table 9 Summary scores of the three skills components 
 Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Countries 704 16.04 4.40 3 33 
English 702 9.96 3.82 0 22 
Arithmetic 696 27.71 8.64 3 40 
In the „Countries‟ test, the students were asked to write down as many countries as they could 
in 90 seconds. This test would be classified in research literature as a test of semantic fluency. 
The origins of such a test can be traced to Thurstone‟s Word Fluency Test for verbal ability 
Thurstone (1938). It may be useful in the examination of, for example, language, executive 
functioning, and speed of information processing. It has been found that education and age 
have an impact on the number of items written down, whereas gender usually has only a 
small effect Ratcliff et al. (1998). In our context, this can be seen as a test of general 
knowledge, verbal skills, and a proxy for the quality of education. In the test, the trainees 
could use any language they wished, and most used Hindi, while some used English. The 
students were not told that they should write down the names of countries prior to the 
beginning of the test, but simply “items from an announced category”. An example using 
animals was given. The scoring of the test was based on the number of items written down, 
regardless of whether they were real countries or not.
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 The average score across 704 
responses was 16.03. 
In the „English‟ test, the students had to first write down as many English words beginning 
with an “F” as they could in 60 seconds, and next, as many beginning with an “S” as they 
could in 60 seconds. This test has a similar origin as the „Countries‟ test as a measure of 
verbal fluency, but it is typically applied to people in their native language. As in our case 
virtually all respondents are native Hindi speakers, the tests serve as an ad-hoc test for 
English vocabulary (for discussion on mono- and bilingual respondents, see Rosselli et al. 
2002). The scoring was based on the average number of proper nouns for the two letters, 
allowing for minor spelling mistakes. Numbers only up to 10 („Four‟, „Five‟, „Six‟, „Seven‟) 
were accepted. The correlation between the two sets of produced words was 0.74 across 702 
respondents. The average combined score was 9.96. 
The „Arithmetic‟ test consisted of 40 calculations based on addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division, at an increasing order of difficulty. The problems should be 
relatively easy for a person who is familiar with and seasoned in arithmetic computations, 
such as primary school teachers. The respondents were given 4 minutes to complete the test. 
They were not allowed to use a calculator, but could use scrap paper and a pen to perform the 
calculations. The average number of solved calculations for 696 responses was 27.71 and 16 
respondents achieved the full score of 40. The test is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 Test for Arithmetic. Notes: The actual size of the test was A4 
The correlation coefficient between the scores for the English and the Countries tests was 
0.40, the Countries and Arithmetic tests 0.47 and English and Arithmetic test 0.51. As a 
measure of skills, the first principal component of the scores for the three tests was 
constructed and normalised to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Table 10 
shows the correlation coefficients between the scores for each sub-test and the first principal 
component. 
Table 10 Correlation of the first principal component with the test scores 
Subtest Correlation with 1st PC 
Arithmetic .83 
English .80 
Countries .77 
Appendix C. Appendix 3 Design of the Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
In this study the job contracts have five attributes, and the attributes have two to four levels as 
follows: a) Pay: 0 - “Rs. 13000 per month”, 1 - “Rs. 17000 per month”, 2 - “Rs. 21000 per 
month”. b) Location: 0 - “Remote village”, 1 - “Village / Small town”, 2 - “Your home 
village / town”, 3 - “District capital area”. c) Contract: 0 - “Fixed term contract, renewable 
every 7 years”, 1 - “Permanent, must transfer every 7 years, 2 - “Permanent, possibility to 
transfer after 7 years”. d) Transfers: 0 - “Depend on connections and influence”, 1 - “Depend 
on merit”. e) Staff and pupils: 0 - “2 teachers, 14 pupils”, 1 - “2 teachers, 75 pupils”. 
These attributes and levels were chosen after consulting a number of academics and policy 
makers in Delhi, as well as officials in states of Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab, 
many of whom were former teachers. The study by Ramachandran et al. 2005 also provided 
useful background information. Sample page is provided in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 Sample page of the DCE. Notes: The actual size of the page was A4 
Thus, there are total of 144 possible contracts arising from combinations {a0,a1,a2} × 
{b0,b1,b2,b3} × {c0,c1,c2} × {d0,d1} × {e0,e1}. Further, there are a total of (144×144-
144)/2 = 10296 possible contract pair comparisons. 
Out of the 10296 possible contract pairs, 12 pairs were selected using the principles from the 
literature on DCEs. Mangham et al. 2009 provide a practical primer, whereas a good 
theoretical starting point is Street et al. 2005 
Out of the 144 possible contracts (full factorial), a fractional factorial of 24 contracts is first 
selected. This is a sub-group for which the levels of attributes are orthogonal. These 24 
contracts are shown in Table 11. An orthogonal fractional factorisation guarantees two 
desirable properties for the DCE: Orthogonality – attributes of the design are independent of 
each other, and level balance – that each attribute level appears in the design with equal 
likelihood (Mangham et al. 2009). 
Table 11 Orthogonal 24-fractional factorial. Contract number and attribute levels 
Contract number Attributes Contract number Attributes 
 a b c d e  a b c d e 
1 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 2 1 0 0 
2 0 0 1 1 1 14 0 2 1 1 1 
3 1 0 0 1 1 15 1 2 0 1 1 
4 1 0 2 0 0 16 1 2 2 0 0 
5 2 0 0 0 1 17 2 2 0 0 1 
6 2 0 2 1 0 18 2 2 2 1 0 
7 0 1 0 1 0 19 0 3 0 1 0 
8 0 1 2 0 1 20 0 3 2 0 1 
9 1 1 0 0 0 21 1 3 0 0 0 
10 1 1 2 1 1 22 1 3 2 1 1 
11 2 1 1 1 0 23 2 3 1 1 0 
12 2 1 1 0 1 24 2 3 1 0 1 
Combining the 24 contracts into 12 pairs randomly should produce unbiased estimates of the 
β and δ parameters in equation 4. However, random pairing is likely to produce a design with 
low efficiency, or larger than necessary standard errors for the estimated parameters. 
To improve the efficiency of the estimates, two further principles can be applied: Minimal 
overlap and utility balance (Huber and Zwerina, 1996). The former states that more 
information can be inferred with a DCE if the levels of attributes within a choice set are 
different (in our case between contracts A and B). The latter principle states that the 
efficiency can be improved by using some prior assumptions about the true parameters, and 
setting the choices within the choice set to have similar overall utility. It has also been argued 
that the techniques for improving the efficiency may not be very important as sample size can 
substitute for an inefficient experimental design (Lusk and Norwood, 2005) 
In this study, 12 contract pairs (choice sets) were selected from the 24 contracts using an 
improvised „Monte Carlo‟ type approach: The 24 contracts were combined into 12 matched 
pairs repeatedly by an algorithm that attempted to minimise the overlap of attribute levels 
between pairs. A set of the resulting “low-overlap” pairings (i.e. different sets of 12 pairs) 
was used to simulate choices for 500 respondents with identical utility functions but 
individual error terms (corresponding to the random utility model).
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 These choices were then 
predicted with a Logit model, and the precision of the estimates was evaluated (the larger the 
determinant of the information matrix, the more precise) 
The process led us to choose the following set of contract number pairings (Contract A, 
Contract B): (16,5), (9,1), (24,7), (15,6), (10,17), (12,19), (22,18), (21,2), (4,14), (11,20), 
(3,13), (23,8). Table 12 below shows the actual choices of the respondents. There were no 
pairs (choice sets) for which a certain option would have always been preferred (either only 
A, or only B) 
Table 12 Frequency of choices in the DCE 
(A,B) Choose A Choose B Non-response % Non-response 
(16,5) 514 172 21 3,1 
(9,1) 426 259 22 3,2 
(24,7) 421 267 19 2,8 
(15,6) 300 390 17 2,5 
(10,17) 484 202 21 3,1 
(12,19) 427 259 21 3,1 
(22,18) 176 511 20 2,9 
(21,2) 258 424 25 3,7 
(4,14) 204 476 27 4 
(11,2) 601 82 24 3,5 
(3,13) 315 362 30 4,4 
(23,8) 566 114 27 4 
Appendix D. Appendix 4 Robustness checks 
This section reports on a set of robustness checks regarding the consistency of the discrete 
choice experiment. Table 13 below reports the results of a number of estimations for the 
sample of standard students, which can be compared with the main results, originally shown 
in column 1 of Table 3. 
Table 13 Robustness checks of the DCE Model 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 Including Excluding Lowland Mountain 
Contract attributes Constant lexicographic districts districts 
Pay (1000 Rs.) .131 [.013]** .136 [.012]** .147 [.017]** .122 [.015]** 
Location: Village/Small town .491 [.109]** .609 [.102]** .532 [.145]** .489 [.127]** 
Location: Home village / town .651 [.097]** .733 [.102]** .879 [.149]** .498 [.123]** 
Location: District Capital area .349 [.114]** .467 [.104]** .464 [.148]** .299 [.127]* 
Contract: Permanent with rotation .673 [.068]** .796 [.073]** .695 [.104]** .657 [.090]** 
Contract: Permanent .775 [.104]** .850 [.107]** .906 [.157]** .699 [.131]** 
Transfers: Based on merit .936 [.076]** .811 [.081]** 1.023 [.115]** .884 [.098]** 
Small class size -.133 [.062]* -.103 [.064] -.087 [.092] -.158 [.079]* 
Female x Pay (1000 Rs.) -.007 [.016] .004 [.017] -.008 [.025] -.002 [.021] 
Female x Village/Small town .186 [.134] .152 [.144] .326 [.207] .088 [.177] 
Female x Home village / town .703 [.141]** .821 [.160]** .987 [.239]** .582 [.178]** 
Female x District Capital area .561 [.138]** .532 [.150]** .619 [.217]** .534 [.181]** 
Female x Permanent with rotation -.185 [.096] -.229 [.104]* -.192 [.149] -.181 [.127] 
Female x Permanent -.065 [.145] -.006 [.162] .111 [.241] -.116 [.185] 
Female x Based on merit .222 [.109]* .231 [.120] .266 [.173] .229 [.141] 
Female x Small class size .126 [.085] .172 [.092] -.012 [.130] .235 [.112]* 
Constant -.017 [.054]       
Observations 4793 4097 2085 2708 
**,* : significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Lowland districts are Haridwar, 
Dehradun and Udham Singh Nagar. Mountain districts are Rudraprayag, Chamoli, Almora, 
and Nainital. Omitted category for Location is „Remote village‟, for Contract „Fixed term 7-
year contract‟, and for Transfers „Based on connections/influence‟. 
If for any reason, for instance due to the order of placement on the questionnaire, respondents 
would have a tendency to choose the A option in the DCE either with a higher, or a lower, 
probability than B, the results could be biased. This can be easily tested by including a 
constant in the model. The model in column [1] in Table 13 shows that a constant is not 
statistically significant and does not affect the results. 
One potential disadvantage of discrete choice experiments in relation to contingent valuation 
is the cognitive complexity of the task for the respondents. It is possible that to simplify the 
task, some respondents use rules of thumb, such as lexicographic ordering, to make their 
choices (Hanley et al. 2001). Column [2] in Table 13 excludes a subset of respondents for 
whom we find lexicographic preferences, i.e. that they always prefer a certain contract 
attribute. This could also reflect strategic behaviour. In the full sample the tendency to exhibit 
such a preference is strongest regarding the “merit-based transfers” option; 57 respondents 
always choose a contract with this attribute when it‟s an option. Strict preferences for other 
attributes were much less frequent. Lancsar and Louviere 2006 argue against deleting 
respondents with lexicographic preferences, since theoretically, a random utility model may 
be able to cope with such preferences, and information is being lost. In our case, the estimates 
remain qualitatively very similar when individuals with lexicographic preferences are 
removed from the sample. 
There may be a concern that the mountainous nature of Uttarakhand makes it an 
unrepresentative state in India and that this may affect the results, especially with respect to 
how different geographic locations are valued. This is addressed in columns [3] and [4], 
which show the results with separate sub-samples for lowland districts (Haridwar, Dehradun, 
Udham Singh Nagar) and mountain districts (Rudraprayag, Chamoli, Almora, Nainital). A 
comparison of the results in columns [3] and [4] suggests that the aversion or remote villages 
is somewhat stronger in the lowland districts, and this applies especially to women. This 
supports the generalisability of the results to rest of India, which is geographically more 
similar to the lowland districts. 
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